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HUMAN RIGHTS QUARTERLY
The Human Rights of Stateless Persons
David Weissbrodt*
Clay Collins**
ABSTRACT
By exploring statelessness through legal, theoretical, and practical lenses,
this article presents a broad examination of the human rights of stateless
persons. The article delineates the rights of stateless persons as enunciated
in various human rights instruments; presents the mechanisms of, and
paths to, statelessness; illustrates the practical struggles of stateless persons
by highlighting the plights of various stateless populations; examines how
the problem of statelessness is being addressed; and considers the complex
political and regional forces affecting policies towards stateless persons.
The article concludes with recommendations regarding remedies and
solutions for statelessness.
I. INTRODUCTION
Article 15 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (the Universal
Declaration) states that "[e]veryone has the right to a nationality"' and that
"no one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality."2 Statelessness,' or
* David Weissbrodt is the Regents Professor and Fredrikson & Byron Professor of Law at the
University of Minnesota. From 1996 to 2003 he was a member of the UN Sub-Commission
on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights; and from 2000 to 2003, he was the Sub-
Commission's Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Non-Citizens.
** Clay Collins is a Research Associate at the University of Minnesota Human Rights Center.
He graduated from Grinnell College in 2003 and was a 2004 recipient of the Upper
Midwest Human Rights Fellowship.
1. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted 10 Dec. 1948, G.A. Res. 217A (111),
U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess. (Resolutions, pt. 1), at 71, art. 15, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948),
reprinted in 43 AM. J. INT'L L. 127 (Supp. 1949) [hereinafter Universal Declaration].
2. Id.
3. According to Article 1 of the 1954 Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons,
a stateless person is "a person who is not considered as a national by any State under the
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the condition of having no legal or effective citizenship,4 is a large and
critical problem.' Provisions intended to prevent or reduce statelessness are
embedded in several international human rights treaties, including the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 6 the Convention on the
Rights of the Child,' the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination against Women,8 the Convention on the Nationality of
Married Women, 9 the Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness,10 and
the Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons," as well as the
Universal Declaration. Indeed, the right not to be stateless, or the right to a
nationality, is widely recognized as a fundamental human right.2
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights addresses the
problem of statelessness by providing that "[e]very child has the right to
acquire a nationality." 3 The Convention on the Rights of the Child further
elaborates on the child's right to a nationality by stating that children "shall
be registered immediately after birth and shall have the right from birth to a
name, [and] the right to acquire a nationality.... States Parties shall ensure
the implementation of these rights ... in particular where the child would
operation of its law." Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons, adopted 28
July 1951, G.A. Res. 429 (V), 360 U.N.T.S. 117 (entered into force 6 June 1960)
[hereinafter 1954 Convention].
4. For the purposes of this article, the terms citizenship and nationality will be used
synonymously.
5. Although no rigorous effort has been made to count the number of stateless persons
worldwide, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) estimates that
there are several million stateless persons. See UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR
REFUGEES (UNHCR), WHAT WOULD LIFE BE LIKE IF You HAD No NATIONALITY? (1999), available at
www.unhcr.ch/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/protect/opendoc.pdf?tbl=PROTECTION&id= 3b8f92124.
6. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted 19 Dec. 1966, G.A. Res.
2200 (XXI), U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 999
U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force 23 Mar. 1976) [hereinafter ICCPR].
7. Convention on the Rights of the Child, adopted 20 Nov. 1989, G.A. Res. 44/25, U.N.
GAOR, 44th Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 167, U.N. Doc. A/44/49 (1989) (entered into force
2 Sept. 1990), reprinted in 28 I.L.M. 1448 (1989) [hereinafter Children's Convention].
8. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, adopted
18 Dec. 1979, G.A. Res. 34/180, U.N. GAOR, 34th Sess., Supp. No. 46, at 193, U.N.
Doc. A/34/46 (1980) (entered into force 3 Sept. 1981), 1249 U.N.T.S. 13, reprinted in
19 I.L.M. 33 (1980) [hereinafter CEDAW].
9. Convention on the Nationality of Married Women, opened for signature 29 Jan. 1957,
G.A. Res. 1040 (Xl), 309 U.N.T.S. 65 (entered into force 11 Aug. 1958) [hereinafter
CNMW].
10. Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, adopted 30 Aug. 1961, G.A. Res 896 (IX),
989 U.N.T.S. 175 (entered into force 13 Dec. 1975) [hereinafter 1961 Convention].
11. 1954 Convention, supra note 3.
12. See generally Michael R. Geske, State Building, Citizenship and Statelessness (1997)
(unpublished report for the Forced Migration Projects of the Open Society Institute),
available at www2.soros.org/fmp2/html/buildintro.html (Mar. 1997).
13. ICCPR, supra note 6, art. 24, T1 3.
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otherwise be stateless."14 This right must be enforced regardless of the
parent's gender. 5 Similarly, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms
of Discrimination against Women provides that states parties should ensure
that "neither marriage to an alien nor change of nationality by the husband
during marriage shall . . . render [a woman] stateless."1 6 In much the same
manner, the Convention on the Nationality of Married Women protects
women from automatically losing their nationality upon marriage or divorce,
or from being rendered stateless by changes in a husband's nationality.1 7
While the treaties identified above were not solely created to address
the problem of statelessness, the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of
Statelessness (the 1961 Convention) focuses exclusively on decreasing
statelessness. Under the citizenship rules that states parties to the 1961
Convention must adopt, many persons who might otherwise be stateless are
able to acquire a citizenship. 8 For example, under the 1961 Convention,
states parties must curb situations in which persons may lose their
citizenship without gaining another.19 Additionally, states parties also must
afford the means for persons born on their territory to obtain citizenship. 0 In
contrast to the 1961 Convention, which focuses on reducing statelessness,
most of the 1954 Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons (the
1954 Convention) is devoted to the protection of stateless persons rather
14. Convention on the Rights of the Child, adopted 20 Nov. 1989, G.A. Res. 44/25, U.N.
GAOR, 44th Sess., Supp. No. 49, art. 7, U.N. Doc. A/44/49 (1989) (entered into force
2 Sept. 1990), reprinted in 28 I.L.M. 1448 (1989). States should seek to reduce the
number of stateless persons, with priority for children, inter alia by encouraging parents
to apply for citizenship on their behalf. See Concluding Observations of the Committee
on the Rights of the Child: Lithuania, U.N. ESCOR, Comm. on Rts. of the Child, 26th
Sess., T 26, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/15/Add.146 (2001) [hereinafter CRC Concluding
Observations: Lithuania]. States should regularize the status of stateless persons,
especially those who have been precluded from applying for residence permits or
citizenship, for example by simplifying procedures for applying for residence permits
and through campaigns to make it clear that stateless persons would not risk expulsion
when identifying themselves to authorities. Prevention of Discrimination, The Rights of
Non-Citizens, The Final Report of the Special Rapporteur, Mr. David Weissbrodt, U.N.
ESCOR, Comm'n on Hum. Rts., 55th Sess., Agenda Item 5, 1 35, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/
Sub.2/2003/23/Add.2 (2003) [hereinafter Weissbrodt Final Report]. Stateless persons
should not be involuntarily repatriated to the countries of origin of their ancestors.
Prevention of Discrimination, The Rights of Non-Citizens, Progress Report of the Special
Rapporteur, Mr. David Weissbrodt, U.N. ESCOR, Comm'n on Hum. Rts., 54th Sess.,
Agenda Item 5, T 15, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2002/25/Add.1 (2002) [hereinafter
Weissbrodt Progress Report].
15. See id. TT 14, 50, 51, 63, 66.
16. CEDAW, supra note 8, art. 9, § 1.
17. CNMW, supra note 9.
18. Geske, supra note 12.
19. Id.
20. Id.
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than the elimination of statelessness. The 1954 Convention does, however,
prescribe that "[clontracting States shall as far as possible facilitate the
assimilation and naturalization of stateless persons."21
The human right not to be stateless, or the right to a nationality, is
important because many states only allow their own nationals to exercise
full civil, political, economic, and social rights within their territories.
Further, nationality enables individuals to receive their nation's protection
both domestically and internationally and allows a state to intercede on
behalf of a national under international law. In this manner, "the rules of
international law relating to diplomatic protection are based on the view
that nationality is the essential condition for securing to the individual the
protection of his rights in the international sphere." 22 For these reasons, the
right to be a citizen of a state has been called "man's basic right for it is
nothing less than the right to have rights." 23 With citizenship being the "right
to have rights," 24 stateless persons have traditionally been seen as having no
rights. This traditional concept of statelessness, which comes from an
international law perspective, follows the logic that because one generally
needs to be a citizen in order to receive diplomatic protection from a state,
no international wrong is committed if another state's citizen is wronged
(i.e., if a stateless person is wronged).21 While international law scholars
might claim that the right to a nationality is the right to have rights, the
principles of human rights would indicate otherwise. The principles of
human rights would maintain that being human is the right to have human
rights. As one human rights scholar has noted, "[h]uman rights are, literally,
the rights that one has simply because one is a human being." 26 Although
"[niational governments may have the primary responsibility for implement-
ing internationally recognized human rights in their own countries . ..
21. 1954 Convention, supra note 3, art. 32.
22. L.V. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 669 (1955), cited in Rachel Settlage, Note, No Place To
Call Home: Stateless Vietnamese Asylum-Seekers In Hong Kong, 12 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J.
187, 192 (1997).
23. Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44, 64 (1958) (Warren, C., dissenting).
24. Id.
25. Paul Weis illustrates such a disconnect by referencing the Dickenson Car Wheel
Company Case between the United States and Mexico (Case No. 115, 4 U.N. Rep. 688,
Ann. Dig. 1931-32):
[The bond of nationalityl is the link between the law and individuals and through it alone are
individuals enabled to invoke the protection of a State and the latter empowered to intervene on
their behalf.
A State, for example, does not commit an international delinquency in inflicting an injury
upon an individual lacking nationality, and consequently no state is empowered to intervene or
complain on his behalf either before or after the injury.
PAUL WEiS, NATIONALITY AND STATELESSNESS I  INTERNATIONAL L W 162 (2d ed. 1979).
26. JACK DONNELLY, UNIVERSAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN THEORY & PRACTICE 10 (2d ed. 2003).
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[h]uman rights are the rights of all human beings, whether they are citizens
..or not."
27
Because being human is the sole requirement entitling one to human
rights, whether or not one possess a nationality should have no bearing on
whether one enjoys all of her or his human rights. As a practical matter,
however, this article demonstrates that international protection is still a
problem. The notion that statelessness should not bar one from realizing her
human rights is embodied in the 1954 Convention. This Convention
provides that, within certain domains, states parties should grant stateless
persons rights on par with the rights that the state gives to its own nationals
or to foreign nationals legally residing within its territory. For example, states
parties should grant stateless persons rights in areas such as religion,
elementary education, access to courts, public rationing of scarce goods,
labor legislation, public relief, and intellectual property that are "at least as
favourable as [those] accorded to their nationals."28 Similarly, states parties
should grant stateless persons rights in areas such as housing, the right of
association, freedom of movement, wage-earning employment, and owner-
ship property that are "not less favourable than [those] accorded to aliens
generally in the same circumstances." 9 It should be noted, however, that
stateless persons unlawfully residing within the territory of a state party are
only granted a limited set of the rights and protections by the 1954
Convention. °
In addition to the 1954 Convention, many other human rights instru-
ments support the notion that holding a nationality is not a prerequisite to
enjoying human rights. Some human rights scholars have even argued that
several human rights instruments purposefully diminish the importance of
nationality in order to prevent statelessness or status as a noncitizen from
being used as a basis for discrimination:
[Diespite the central role the concept of citizenship played in the rise of human
rights culture, the words "citizen" and "citizenship" are rare in the major
international human rights instruments. Indeed, the sense of the instruments
themselves to is to erode the importance of the very concept which originally
gave rise to the idea of fundamental human rights [i.e. citizenship], in the
interest of doing away altogether with boundaries between privileged and non-
privileged.3
27. Id. at 159-60.
28. 1954 Convention, supra note 3, art. 4.
29. Id. art. 13.
30. See generally id.
31. Claude Cahn, Editorial, Privileging the Document, RoMA RTs. Q. 3/2003, available at
www.errc.org/cikk.php?cikk=l 055.
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The Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, for example, requires states
"to respect and to ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to
its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the present Covenant, without
distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion,
political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other
status";32 the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights contains an
almost identical clause.33 Additionally, the Human Rights Committee, the
treaty body for the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, has further
elaborated on this principle of nondiscrimination as it applies to noncitizens
(including stateless persons) in its General Comment 15:
In general, the rights set forth in the Covenant apply to everyone, irrespective of
reciprocity, and irrespective of his or her nationality or statelessness.
2. Thus, the general rule is that each one of the rights of the Covenant must be
guaranteed without discrimination between citizens and aliens. Aliens receive
the benefit of the general requirement of non-discrimination in respect of the
rights guaranteed in the Covenant, as provided for in article 2 thereof.34
The Universal Declaration also contains a nondiscrimination statement
that is almost identical to the nondiscrimination provision in the Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights.3" Similarly, Article 1 of the European Conven-
tion for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
requires states parties to "secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the
rights and freedoms [of the Convention]."36
32. ICCPR, supra note 6, art. 2, T 1. It should be noted that this is not one of the non-
derogable articles mentioned in Article 4. Id. art. 4, 2. Also, Article 25 specifies that
"every citizen" has the right to vote, take part in public affairs, to be elected, and to have
access to public service. Id. art. 25.
33. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, adopted 16 Dec.
1966, G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI), U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, art. 2(2), U.N. Doc.
A/6316 (1966), 993 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force 3 Jan. 1976).
34. Compilation of General Comments and General Recommendations Adopted by Human
Rights Treaty Bodies, U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., 27 Sess., 9]9 1-2, U.N. Doc. HRI/
GEN/1/Rev.1 (1994).
35. See Universal Declaration, supra note 1, art. 2.
36. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
opened for signature 4 Nov. 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, Europ. T.S. No. 5, art. 1 (entered
into force 3 Sept. 1953).
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II. DE JURE AND DE FACTO STATELESSNESS AND THE
1954 AND 1961 STATELESSNESS CONVENTIONS
According to the 1954 Convention, a stateless person is "a person who is
not considered as a national by any State under the operation of its law."37
This definition of statelessness has been classified as de jure statelessness
because it is a purely legal description; the characteristics and value of a
particular person's nationality as it is realized in his particular home state is
irrelevant to the definition. Some have lauded the conciseness and brevity
of this definition of statelessness, favoring it because it sets down a single,
clear, and unambiguous criterion for statelessness: a person simply is or is
not a citizen according to a state's laws and court system.3 8
Some legal scholars, however, believe that the concept of statelessness
should encompass more than de jure statelessness. These legal scholars
believe that the 1954 Convention's definition of statelessness is too narrow
and limiting because it excludes those persons whose citizenship is
practically useless or who cannot prove or verify their nationality. To be
sure, it is often pointed out that the problem with the de jure definition of
statelessness is that it excludes those individuals who might technically
have a nationality yet are not able to obtain or enjoy the concomitant
benefits and protection.
[The definition of statelessness outlined in the 1954 Convention] precludes full
realization of an effective nationality because it is a technical, legal definition
which can address only technical, legal problems. Quality and attributes of
citizenship are not included, even implicitly, in the definition. Human rights
principles relating to citizenship are not delineated, despite the inspiration of
the Conventions themselves by article 15 of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights. The definition is not one of quality, simply one of fact.39
These statements epitomize the argument that persons with no effective
nationality are, for all practical purposes, stateless, and should be labeled
and treated as such. In this view, the definition of statelessness should be
broadened to include de facto statelessness. Persons who are de facto
37. 1954 Convention, supra note 3, art. 1. In addition to defining statelessness in the 1954
Convention, this definition is presumed to define statelessness in the 1961 Convention
on the Reduction of Statelessness.
38. Carol Batchelor, from the Division of International Protection at UNHCR, has argued
that a person either is or is not a citizen according to the laws and court system of a
state, by noting that "[wlhile there may be complex legal issues involved in determining
whether or not an event has occurred by operation of law, national courts have means
of resolving such questions." Carol A. Batchelor, Stateless Persons: Some Gaps in
International Protection, 7 IN'. J. REFUGEE L. 232, 232 (1995).
39. Id.
2006
HUMAN RIGHTS QUARTERLY
stateless often have a nationality according to the law, but this nationality is
not effective or they cannot prove or verify their nationality. De facto
statelessness can occur when governments withhold the usual benefits of
citizenship, such as protection, and assistance, or when persons relinquish
the services, benefits, and protection of their country.40 Put another way,
persons who are de facto stateless might have legal claim to the benefits of
nationality but are not, for a variety of reasons, able to enjoy these benefits.
They are, effectively, without a nationality.
The drafters of the 1954 and 1961 Conventions did not define
statelessness to include de facto statelessness for at least three reasons.
41
First, the drafters wanted to sidestep an overlap between the 1954
Convention and the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees.42 At
the time, an overlap between the 1954 Statelessness Convention and the
1951 Refugee Convention seemed superfluous because the drafters of the
two Statelessness Conventions incorrectly assumed that all de facto stateless
persons were, and would conceivably be, refugees:
43
40. See generally id.
41. Despite the reluctance of the drafters of the 1954 Convention to acknowledge de facto
statelessness, the Final Act of the 1961 Convention does recommend "that persons who
are stateless de facto should as far as possible be treated as stateless de jure to enable
them to acquire an effective nationality." United Nations Conference on the Elimination
or Reduction of Future Statelessness, 30Aug. 1961, Final Act, 91 23, U.N. Doc. A/Conf./
9/14 (1961).
42. Carol A. Batchelor, Statelessness and the Problem of Resolving Nationality Status, 10
INT'L I. REFUGEE L. 156, 172 (1998).
43. Id. As previously mentioned, the drafters of the 1954 and 1961 Conventions assumed
that all de facto stateless persons were, and would conceivably be, refugees. Time has
shown, however, that this assumption was incorrect. In fact, Carol Batchelor, the Legal
Advisor on Statelessness and Related Nationality Issues to the UNHCR, has claimed that
"the majority of de jure and de facto stateless persons requiring assistance on questions
relating to their nationality status are not, today, refugees." Id. at 173. According to the
1951 Refugee Convention, a refugee is someone who is outside of her country or
country of former habitual residence and is "unwilling or unable to return to it" because
of a because of a "well-founded fear of being persecuted" or is unable to unwilling to
"avail himself of the protection of that country" for fear of being persecuted. Convention
Relating to the Status of Refugees, adopted 28 July 1951, art. 1, § a, 9 2, U.N. Doc. A/
CONF.2/108 (1951), 189 U.N.T.S. 150 (entered into force 22 April 1954), reprinted in
3 WESTON III.G.4. There are several reasons why de facto stateless persons might not
qualify as refugees under this convention and, hence, would not receive protection
under its auspices. For example, a de facto stateless person might not be outside of her
country or country of former habitual residence. Because a person must-in an attempt
to flee from persecution-transverse an international border into another country to be
considered a refugee, all de facto stateless persons who stay within their country cannot
be considered refugees. Additionally, an individual who is not considered a refugee
under international law and is unable to demonstrate that she has no nationality (that
she is de jure stateless) will not necessarily be protected under the two statelessness
conventions or the refugee convention. See Carol A. Batchelor, UNHCR and Issues
Related to Nationality, 14 REFUGEE SURV. Q. 91 (1995). Also, the fact that one is de facto
stateless does not necessarily mean that one has a well-founded fear of persecution.
Vol. 28
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The definition of a de jure stateless person was chosen in order to exclude the
question of whether the person has faced persecution, as there are conflicts of
laws issues which might result in statelessness without any wilful act of neglect,
discrimination, or violation on the part of the State. De facto statelessness, on
the other hand, was presumed to be the result of an act on the part of the
individual, such as fleeing the country of nationality because of persecution by
the State. The drafters of the 1954 and 1961 Conventions felt that all those who
faced persecution, and who did not have an effective nationality, would be
considered refugees and would receive assistance from the international
community under the terms of the 1951 [Geneva] Convention relating to the
Status of Refugees. Quite intentionally, then, the drafters of the 1954 Conven-
tion relating to the Status of Stateless Persons adopted a strictly legal definition
of stateless persons. 4
4
Additionally, the drafters of the 1954 and 1961 Conventions, respectively,
wanted a clear definition of statelessness in order to preclude situations
where a person might be considered de facto stateless but not de jure
stateless, or vice versa. 45 Further, the drafters did not want the Conventions
to be the impetus for persons to attempt to secure a second nationality, if
they felt they were de facto stateless.
46
III. MECHANISMS OF STATELESSNESS
There are many paths to statelessness. In the information and accession
package for the 1954 and 1961 Conventions, the Office of the United
Nations High Commissioner for Refuges lists ten reasons why people
become stateless. These reasons are as follows: conflict of laws; transfer of
territory; laws related to marriage; administrative practices; discrimination;
laws related to registration of births; jus sanguinis; denationalization;
renunciation of citizenship; and automatic loss of citizenship by operation
of law. 47 Rather than attempting to delineate the reasons for statelessness, a
task that would require one to consider everything from human motivation
to the climate of international relations, it is more suitable to identify the
Certainly, there are countries in which de facto stateless persons do not live in fear of
persecution but still do not enjoy all benefits of citizenship such as the right to work,
health care, and education.
44. Batchelor, Statelessness and the Problem of Resolving Nationality Status, supra note 42,
at 172.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES (UNHCR), INFORMATION AND ACCESSION PACKAGE:
THE 1954 CONVENTION RELATING TO THE STATUS OF STATELESS PERSONS AND THE 1961 CONVENTION ON
THE REDUCTION OF STATELESSNESS (rev. ed. 1999).
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mechanisms by which people become stateless. This latter methodology
provides a more concrete aim with a narrower scope.
A. Mechanisms of De jure Statelessness
As stated before, a person is de jure stateless if she is not considered a
national under the laws of any country. As such, the mechanisms of
statelessness are almost always citizenship laws and the guiding principles
behind citizenship laws. Perhaps the two most ubiquitous principles of
citizenship are jus soli and jus sanguinis. Jus soli and jus sanguinis are
principles that dictate the criteria used to grant or deny citizenship. jus soli
literally means law of the land; and according to the most common
interpretation of this principle, citizenship is based on place of birth. The
principle of jus soli is often contrasted with jus sanguinis, which dictates
that citizenship is based on family heritage or descent. jus sanguinis
generally dictates that citizenship should be given to individuals with a
certain heritage or whose parent, usually the father, is a citizen of a given
state.
Instead of being pure reflections of either jus sanguinis or jus soli, most
countries' citizenship laws reflect a mixture of these two principles. For
example, the U.S. "recognizes the U.S. citizenship of individuals according
to ... jus soli, or right of birthplace, and jus sanguinis, or right of blood."48
That is, individuals born in the U.S. are granted citizenship regardless of
their parents' citizenship, according to the principle of jus soli,4 9 and
individuals born abroad to US citizens are also given US citizenship,
according to the principle of jus sanguinis.
Unfortunately, the jus sanguinis nationality laws of some countries grant
citizenship through paternal descent alone. In these countries, a mother
cannot independently pass her nationality on to her children. Hence, in
many countries with jus sanguinis nationality laws that only recognize
paternal decent, if a woman marries a stateless person or has children out of
wedlock with a man of her own nationality, then her children would be
born into statelessness5 0 Discrimination against children born out of
wedlock, however, is prohibited by Article 25(2) of the Universal Declara-
48. U.S. Dept. Homeland Security, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, Citizenship:
Naturalization Information (Eligibility and Procedures), available at httpv/uscis.gov/
graphics/services/natz/citizen.htm.
49. One exception, however, is that children of foreign diplomats or heads of state are not
given US citizenship.
50. Geske, supra note 12.
Vol. 28
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tion, which states that "[a]ll children, whether born in or out of wedlock,
shall enjoy the same social protection.""1
There are other ways in which jus sanguinis nationality laws can
engender statelessness in newly born children. Let us take, for example, a
case in which a child is born in one country to stateless parents. If the jus
sanguinis laws governing the territory where the child is born only allow
citizenship though parental descent, such a situation would render the child
stateless. Kuwaiti nationality laws, for example, provide no means for the
child of two stateless parents to obtain nationality at birth.52 Furthermore,
only limited citizenship opportunities exist for children born to a Kuwaiti
mother and a stateless father, and these options all involve petitioning the
Minister of the Interior. 3 Similarly, a citizenship bill that was put before the
Indonesian house in February 2003 regulates the citizenship of children
"born out of both legitimate and illicit relationships." 4 The bill grants
citizenship to children born within the borders of Indonesia from a lawful
marriage between a stateless or foreign father and an Indonesian mother.
Children with noncitizen fathers who are born out of wedlock to Indonesian
mothers are still denied Indonesia citizenship, regardless of where they
were born.5 1
Under certain circumstances, jus sanguinis nationality laws, which only
recognize parental descent, can also produce statelessness in the newborn
children of married, non-stateless, parents. Let us take, for example, a
situation in which a male citizen of the United States moves to Belgium,
marries a Belgian woman, and fathers a son. According to the principle of
jus sanguinis, the son would have US citizenship by virtue of having a
parent with US citizenship. If the son were born prior to 1984, however, the
child would not receive Belgian citizenship, because prior to 1984,
Belgium's jus sanguinis nationality laws granted citizenship via parental
descent only. 6 If the son married a Belgian woman and never set foot in the
United States, then the son's children, born prior to 1984, would be
51. Universal Declaration, supra note 1, art. 25.
52. CLARISA BENCOMO, KUWAIT, PROMISES BETRAYED: DENIAL OF RIGHTS OF BIDUN, WOMEN, AND FREEDOM
OF EXPRESSION, at ch. 4 (2000), available at www.hrw.org/reports/2000/kuwait/kuwait-
04.htm#P1 68_23590.
53. Id.
54. Moch N. Kurniawan & Berni K. Moestafa, Citizenship Bill Maintains Institutionalized
Racism, JAKARTA POST, 6 Feb. 2003.
55. Although the provisions of this bill do not grant Indonesian citizenship to children, born
in Indonesia, whose parents are both stateless, the bill's provisions are an improvement
over the existing laws of Indonesia. The bill provides greater protection to women
married to stateless men or foreign citizens, id., and this protection does not often co-
exist with jus sanguinis laws.
56. See generally Edwige L. Lefebvre, Belgian Citizenship: Managing Linguistic, Regional,
and Economic Demands, 7 CITIZENSHIP STUD. 111 (2003).
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stateless. Indeed, the son's children would not be granted Belgian citizen-
ship because their father is not Belgian; the children also would be denied
US citizenship because, with little exception, the United States denies
citizenship to children of parents with US citizenship who have never lived
within its territory.
As the above examples have shown, jus sanguinis nationality laws not
only produce statelessness, they also perpetuate statelessness from one
generation to the next. Article 5 of the Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD) arguably precludes jus sanguinis
nationality laws by providing that "States Parties undertake to ... guarantee
the right of everyone, without distinction as to race, colour, or national or
ethnic origin, to equality before the law, notably in the enjoyment of the
following rights: . . . (d) [o]ther civil rights, in particular ... (iii) [t]he right to
nationality.""7 In addition, the situation of children born to noncitizen
parents is addressed in the Convention on the Rights of the Child. Under
Article 7 of that Convention, a child "shall be registered immediately after
birth and shall have the right from birth to a name, [and] the right to acquire
a nationality . . . . States Parties shall ensure the implementation of these
rights . . . , in particular where the child would otherwise be stateless."58 In
view of the near universal ratification of the Convention on the Rights of the
Child, the principle of jus soli, citizenship based on the place of birth, has
emerged as the overriding international norm governing the nationality of
children born to noncitizen parents.5 9 This right must be enforced without
discrimination as to the gender of the parent.60 Furthermore, Article 7 of the
57. U.N. G.A. Res. 2106 (XX), Annex, 20 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 14), at 47, U.N. Doc. A/
6014 (1966), 660 U.N.T.S. 195 (entered into force 4 Jan. 1969), cited in AMNESTY
INTERNATIONAL, BHUTAN: NATIONALITY, EXPULSION, STATELESSNESS AND THE RIGHT TO RETURN (2000),
available at web.amnesty.org/library/indey,/ENGASA1 40012000.
58. States should seek to reduce the number of stateless persons, with priority for children,
inter alia by encouraging parents to apply for citizenship on their behalf. See CRC
Concluding Observations: Lithuania, supra note 14, 26. States should regularize the
status of stateless persons, especially those who have been precluded from applying for
residence permits or citizenship, for example by simplifying procedures for applying for
residence permits and through campaigns to make it clear that stateless persons would
not risk expulsion when identifying themselves to authorities. See Weissbrodt Final
Report, supra note 14, 35. Stateless persons should not be involuntarily repatriated to
the countries of origin of their ancestors. See Weissbrodt Progress Report, supra note 14,
I 15.
59. See id. $% 7-9, 55, 58; ASBJORN EIDE, CITIZENSHIP AND INTERNATIONAL LAW WITH SPECIFIC REFERENCE
TO HUMAN RIGHTS LAW: STATUS, EVOLUTION AND CHALLENGES (2001); Asbjorn Eide, Working
Paper on Citizenship and the Minority Rights of Non-Citizens, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/
AC.5/1999/WP.3 (1999). Efforts by states to end discrimination in their nationality laws
between children born in and out of wedlock are welcome. Concluding observations of
the Committee on the Rights of the Child: United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland, U.N. ESCOR, Comm. on Rts. of the Child, 31 st Sess., 9] 22, U.N. Doc.
CRC/C/I 5/Add.1 88 (2002).
60. See Weissbrodt Progress Report, supra note 14, 99$ 14, 50, 51, 63, 66.
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Convention requires transmittal of citizenship from a parent to his or her
adopted child.61 Article 7 should be read in conjunction with Article 8
(preservation of identity, including nationality, name, and family relations);
Article 9 (avoiding separation from parents); Article 10 (family reunifica-
tion); and Article 20 (continuity of upbringing of children deprived of their
family environment).
Another common mechanism of de jure statelessness is dependent
nationality.62 Dependent nationality refers to the practice of linking the
nationality of a married woman to her spouse,63 thus making the wife's
nationality dependent upon her husband's citizenship. When the rules of
dependent nationality are strictly applied, a woman can be rendered
stateless by divorce or the death of her husband because the wife's link to a
citizenship bearing husband has been severed by these events.64 Similarly,
"[ijf a woman from a state that automatically deprived her of her nationality
on marriage (based on some form of dependent nationality) [weds] a man
from a state that [does] not automatically grant her nationality on marriage
(based on some form of independent nationality), then she [would become]
stateless."6 Further, on the principle of dependent nationality, a woman
who marries a foreign national would lose her citizenship and acquire the
citizenship of her husband simply because of her new marriage. Further-
more, if the woman's husband changed or lost his nationality, her national-
ity would consequently be altered or lost altogether.66
A new set of problems can arise for a woman who loses her original
citizenship after marriage to a man of another nationality, due to dependent
nationality laws, and moves to another country. For example, if the woman
divorces her husband or her husband dies, she may be unable to reenter her
61. See Weissbrodt Final Report, supra note 14, 60. Inter-country adoptions must allow
adopting parents to transfer their nationality to adopted children, who must be allowed
to own or inherit land or to benefit from health, education, and social service subsidies.
Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Rights of the Child: Palau, U.N.
ESCOR, Comm. on Rts. of the Child, 26th Sess., 91 40, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/1 5/Add.1 49
(2001).
62. "Until the First World War, the nationality laws of virtually all countries made a married
woman's nationality dependent on her husband's nationality." Alexander N. Makarov,
La NationalitL de la Femme Marine [The Nationality of Married Women], in RECUEIL oES
COURS [REVIEw OF COURSES] 199 n.72 (1938).
63. Dependent nationality can be seen in contrast to independent nationality, according to
which women retain their nationality regardless of their marital status.
64. COMMITTEE ON FEMINISM AND INTERNATIONAL AW, FINAL REPORT ON WOMEN'S EQUALITY AND
NATIONALITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 17 (2000).
65. Id. at 29.
66. Id. at 17. See also Working Paper on the rights of women married to foreigners,
Submitted by Vladimir Kartashkin in Accordance with Subcommission Decision 2002/
112, U.N. ESCOR, Comm'n on Hum. Rts., 55th Sess., Agenda Item 6a, U.N. Doc. E/
CN.4/Sub.2/2003/34 (2003).
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former country because she no longer holds the country's nationality. 7 Even
if the woman manages to regain her former citizenship and enter her former
state, there is a strong possibility that her children will not be granted their
mother's former citizenship provided the mother's former country employs
strict jus sanguinis laws that grant citizenship solely based on paternal
descent.68 Often, the result of dependent nationality and the principle of
paternal descent and jus sanguinis is that statelessness is inherited and
"passed from generation to generation regardless of place of birth, number
of years of residency, cultural ties, or the fact that in some cases the
individuals concerned have neither entered nor resided in another state." 69
Of course, these problems of statelessness do not occur in isolation:
Documentary requirements may compound these problems. Wars, other
conflicts, and administrative mistakes often create insuperable obstacles to
documenting birth, marriage, parentage, or residence. Children born in a
refugee area outside of their parents' state of citizenship during an armed
conflict may later find it difficult or impossible to document their parentage or
date and place of birth. If secure and accessible document depositories for birth
and marriage records are not maintained, such children may not be able to
prove or successfully apply for citizenship.70
The unfortunate effects of dependent nationality laws are addressed by
the Convention on the Nationality of Married Women. Under this Conven-
tion, states parties "[agree] that neither the celebration nor the dissolution of
a marriage between one of its nationals and an alien, nor the change of
nationality by the husband during marriage, shall automatically affect the
nationality of the wife." 71 However, the Convention requires that states
parties allow a noncitizen wife of one of its nationals, "at her request, [to]
acquire the nationality of her husband through specially privileged natural-
ization procedures."72 Also, the Convention on the Nationality of Married
Women requires citizenship laws that make it so that "neither the voluntary
acquisition of the nationality of another State nor the renunciation of its
nationality by one of its nationals shall prevent the retention of its
nationality by the wife of such national." 71
Both patrilineal descent laws as well as dependent nationality laws are
addressed by the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimina-
tion against Women (CEDAW):
67. Geske, supra note 12.
68. Id.
69. Batchelor, UNHCR and Issues Related to Nationality, supra note 43, at 104-05.
70. Geske, supra note 12.
71. CNMW, supra note 9, art. 1.
72. Id. art. 3, 11 1.
73. Id. art. 2.
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1. States Parties shall grant women equal rights with men to acquire, change or
retain their nationality. They shall ensure in particular that neither marriage to
an alien nor change of nationality by the husband during marriage shall
automatically change the nationality of the wife, render her stateless or force
upon her the nationality of her husband.
2. States Parties shall grant women equal rights with men with respect to the
nationality of their children. 4
Changes in citizenship laws are another common mechanism of
statelessness. Changes of citizenship laws often create the risk that persons
who were considered citizens according to old laws might be rendered
stateless by new laws. For example, in Zaire, a law passed in 197175 granted
nationality to the Banyarwanda people, who thus obtained certain civil and
political rights such as the right to stand for election and the right to vote. In
1981, however, Law No. 81-002 amended the previous legislation and
retroactively denied nationality to thousands of Banyarwanda 7 6 These
Banyarwanda, having no other nationality, have been rendered stateless.
77
Likewise, in 2001, Zimbabwe instituted laws that revoked Zimbabwean
citizenship from Zimbabwean nationals who held a foreign citizenship or
who had failed to renounce any claim to foreign citizenship, even if they
did not know about the claim.18 Essentially, Zimbabweans with dual
citizenship or with a potential claim to foreign citizenship had to renounce
their foreign citizenship or their claims to foreign citizenship in order to
keep their Zimbabwean status.7 9 The result of the Zimbabwean legislation
was that millions of Zimbabweans with foreign parentage or with foreign
sounding names, 80 most of whom were born and raised in Zimbabwe, have
had their citizenships withdrawn and have had their national "identities...
confiscated by the state until they prove that they have renounced any
claims to foreign citizenship."
81
Persons can also become stateless by renouncing their citizenship
before acquiring another nationality. For example, in order to avoid the
74. CEDAW, supra note 8, art. 9, 9 1-2.
75. See Zaire Decree Law No. 71-020 (26 Mar. 1971) (cited in Report on the Situation of
Human Rights in Zaire, Prepared by the Special Rapporteur, Mr. Roberto Garreton, in
Accordance with Commission Resolution 1994/87, U.N. ESCOR, Comm'n on Hum.
Rts., 51st Sess., Agenda Item 12, 26, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1997/6/Add.1 (1995)).
76. Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Zaire, Prepared by the Special Rapporteur,
Mr. Roberto Garreton, in Accordance with Commission Resolution 1994/87, U.N.
ESCOR, Comm'n on Hum. Rts., 51st Sess., Agenda Item 12, 11 26, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/
1997/6/Add.1 (1995).
77. Id.
78. Zimbabweans Team Up to Fight New Citizenship Act, FINANCIAL GAZETTE, 20 Dec. 2001.
79. Pressure Group to Sue Govt, FINANCIAL GAZETTE, 7 Jan. 2002.
80. Zimbabweans Team Up, supra note 78.
81. Id.
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Vietnam War draft, a US citizen named Thomas Jolley went to the US
Consulate in Toronto, Canada, in 1967 and renounced his citizenship.
Because Jolley had no citizenship other than his US citizenship, he had
made himself stateless through his actions.8 2 Similarly, in the early 1990s, a
few hundred Romanians simultaneously filed for political asylum in Ger-
many and renounced their Romanian citizenship, thereby instantly making
them stateless.83
Persons may also become stateless if their government revokes their
citizenship and they do not have a second citizenship. This situation can be
illustrated by the case of John Demjanjuk, a former German citizen who had
immigrated to the United States. Having been charged by the Israeli
Supreme Court of being "Ivan the Terrible," an infamous concentration
camp guard during World War II, the United States stripped him of his
citizenship and sent him to Tel Aviv, where he was acquitted by the Israeli
Supreme Court and sent back to the United States as a stateless person.8 4
The United States and other nations, such as Canada, have on several
occasions denaturalized, and often rendered stateless, persons believed to
have purposefully concealed their Nazi involvement when applying for US
or Canadian immigration and citizenship.8s Often, states revoke citizenship
from naturalized citizens for performing subversive activities, for generally
being a threat to state security, for voting in another country's elections, or
for giving incorrect or inaccurate information when registering for citizenship.
Revoking citizenship under such conditions is not uncommon. Many
countries denaturalize and deport their own nationals if naturalization was
gained through misrepresentation, or if a national's actions critically
threaten the state's interests. In such cases, the state's right to deprive
citizenship is not out of step with international principles, even if such a
deprivation would render a person stateless. For example, the provisions of
82. Milton C. Lorenz, Jr., Renunciation of Nationality Leaves Individual Stateless and
Excludable as Any Alien, 46 TuL. L. REV. 984, 987 (1972).
83. Cristian Stefanescu, Editorial, Daily Deplores German Arguments for Maintaining Visa
Requirements for Romanians, EVENIMENTUL ZILEI, 3 Feb. 2001 (on file with author).
84. See John W. Heath Jr., Note, Journey Over "Strange Ground": From Demjanjuk to the
International Criminal Court Regime, 13 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 383, 384 (1999). It should be
noted that although Demjanjuk was not found to be the infamous death camp guard
"Ivan the Terrible," Demjanjuk was found to have purposefully concealed his Nazi
involvement when applying for US citizenship. This concealment was the basis for
Demjanjuk's denaturalization.
85. Claire I. Farid, A Primer on Citizenship Revocation for WVVII Collaboration: The 1998-
1999 Federal Court Term, 38 ALTA. L. REV. 415 (2000). See generally Charles Mahaleris,
Nazi Prison Guard to be Deported, TALON NEWS, 26 Mar. 2004, available at httpv/
mensnewsdaily.com/archive/newswire/news2004/0304/032604-nazi.htm; Press Release,
U.S. Dept. Justice, Justice Department Files Suit to Revoke Citizenship of Former
Member of Lithuanian Mobile Killing Unit (20 Sept. 1994), available atwww.usdoj.gov/
opa/pr/Pre_96/September94/536.txt.html.
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the 1961 Convention do not apply where "nationality has been obtained by
misrepresentation or fraud," 86 or where a person has, "inconsistently with
his duty of loyalty to the Contracting State . . . conducted himself in a
manner seriously prejudicial to the vital interests of the State." 87 Likewise,
the 1954 Convention does not apply to persons about whom "there are
serious reasons for considering that . . . [tihey have committed a crime
against peace, a war crime, or a crime against humanity ... [or] [t]hey have
committed a serious non-political crime outside the country of their
residence prior to their admission to that country."8 8 Because countries
typically do not strip their native-born nationals of citizenship, it has been
argued that the practice of depriving citizenship from naturalized citizens is
discriminatory, because this practice creates a lesser class of citizens whose
citizenship can be revoked. 89
Statelessness also occurs when states are dissolved, succeeded, or
broken up or when territory is transferred. Indeed, transfer of territory
resulting from state dissolution, succession, or breakup is one of the most
well-known and common causes of statelessness. Statelessness following
state dissolution became a notable human rights issue after a number of
political transitions in Central and Eastern Europe.90 After the dissolution of
the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia, succeeding states sought
to redefine citizenship requirements. This resulted in statelessness and
general uncertainty surrounding the citizenship status of former Soviet,
Czechoslovakian, and Yugoslavian citizens, respectively.
After the dissolution of the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia and the break-up
of Yugoslavia, millions of people needed to confirm a new citizenship status.
Was a former Czechoslovak citizen now Czech or Slovak? Was someone born
in Belgrade, raised in Sarajevo, now married to someone from Zagreb and living
in Ljubliana, a Yugoslav, Bosnian, Croat or Slovene citizen? New states
emerging from these dissolutions established their own criteria for citizenship.
In some cases, people who did not meet those criteria became "stateless"; in
other cases they failed to acquire citizenship where they lived.9 1
State succession is also problematic because newly formed successor
states have had less time than established states to ratify and implement
86. 1961 Convention, supra note 10, art. 8 9 2.
87. Id. art. 8, 3.
88. Id. art. 1, 91 2.
89. Sarah Left, Comment: Once a Citizen, Always a Citizen, GUARDIAN, 25 Feb. 2003,
available at www.guardian.co.uk/print/0,3858,4613227-103601,00.html. See also Jill
Singer, Once a Citizen, Always a Citizen, HERALD SUN, 27 Dec. 2002, at 21.
90. Geske, supra note 12.
91. UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES (UNHCR), THE STATE OF THE WORLD'S REFUGEES:
Finy YEARS OF HUMANITARIAN ACTION 185, 189 (2000).
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human rights treaties that may provide protections against statelessness.
Additionally, if a former state was broken up because of ethnic conflict and
divided among major ethnic groups, the successor states likely will have
less motivation or support for creating liberal citizenship laws or for ratifying
treaties that may guarantee citizenship to large populations of ethnic
minorities.
Certainly, when state succession occurs without constitutional or
legislative provisions in place to ensure citizenship to all former citizens of
the dissolved state, large numbers of persons are often rendered de jure
stateless.92 When a state is dissolved or broken up, the possibility always
exists that persons considered citizens under the laws of the dissolved state,
might not be granted citizenship by a successor state. For instance:
When the Baltic states regained independence, their nationality laws excluded
hundreds of thousands of ethnic Russians who had lived there for decades.
When many Crimean Tatars returned to Ukraine [after the break up of the Soviet
Union], their families having been deported from there by Stalin in the 1940s,
some arrived after the termination date for ... access to Ukrainian citizenship,
creating difficulties in finding jobs and housing. Yugoslavia's violent break-up
displaced over four million people, and many records needed to trace
citizenship were destroyed, creating numerous problems. When Czechoslova-
kia broke into two republics, many living on the Czech side were attributed
Slovak citizenship, making them foreigners in their place of habitual residence.
In Asia, the Biharis (non-Bengali Muslims who moved from India to what
was East Pakistan in the late 1940s) considered themselves to be Pakistani
nationals and refused to take Bangladeshi nationality when Bangladesh gained
independence in 1971. The government of Pakistan has since been reluctant to
"repatriate" them, and over 200,000 are still in camps in Bangladesh.93
Indeed, whenever citizenship laws are changed, the possibility always
exists that persons considered citizens according to the old laws might be
rendered stateless by the new laws. Take, for example, an ethnic minority
who was born and has always lived in the state of their nationality. The
state's territory, however, is dissolved and succeeded by another state. The
former citizen would expect to be given citizenship of the successor state,
given that it took control of the territory in which the former citizen has
always lived and resided. However, if the successor state strictly imposes jus
sanguinis citizenship laws, and only grants citizenship to the territory's
ethnic majority, then the former citizen would be rendered stateless. 4
92. Geske, supra note 12.
93. UNHCR, THE STATE OF THE WORLD'S REFUGEES, supra note 91, at 189.
94. The circumstances of this example could be reversed to produce the same result
(statelessness). For example, let us consider a case in which a person (a citizen of one
state) wishes to immigrate to, and obtain citizenship from, another state. The citizenship
laws of the second state, however, do not allow dual citizenship and require the
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Let us consider another hypothetical example in which a person resides
in the state of her citizenship. This state, however, is dissolved and its
territory is divided between two successor states. The former citizen might
expect to be given the citizenship of the state controlling the territory that
she calls home. Given her ancestry, she is initially allowed only the
citizenship of the second successor state, the one that does not control the
land on which she lives. If she does not have the resources to travel to the
state of her new citizenship, or the documentation to prove her former
citizenship, then she may be rendered stateless.
B. Mechanisms of De Facto Statelessness
Although the category of de facto stateless persons is sufficiently broad to
include all persons who have a citizenship yet do not receive the
concomitant benefits and protection that typically accompany citizenship,
the term de facto stateless is, more often than not, applied to those persons
who do not enjoy the rights of citizenship enjoyed by other noncriminal
citizens of the same state." Consequently, most persons considered de facto
stateless are the victims of state repression. Whereas de jure statelessness
can simply result from the oversight of lawmakers who leave gaps in the law
through which persons can fall, de facto statelessness typically results from
state discrimination. Consequently, it is not surprising that the mechanisms
of de jure statelessness differ from those of de facto statelessness.
One mechanism of de facto statelessness is slavery and human
trafficking. Radhika Coomaraswamy, the UN Special Rapporteur on Vio-
lence Against Women, has highlighted problems of de facto statelessness
among women trafficked to work in the sex trade.9 6 For many trafficked
women, "nationality is not a means to diplomatic assistance because often
their passports are taken away by the pimp or brothel owner, and they are
citizenship applicant to renounce his former citizenship in order to naturalize; the
applicant does so and is granted a new nationality. Some time after naturalization, the
person's new state is dissolved and succeeded by another state that implements strict jus
soli citizenship and only grants citizenship to persons born within the territorial
boundaries of that state. Such a case would render stateless the person used in this
example.
95. Hence, someone is usually not said to be de facto stateless if he or she has been
convicted of a crime and denied the right, for example, to vote.
96. Report of the Special Rapporteur on Violence against Women, Its Causes and
Consequences, Ms. Radhika Coomaraswamy, Addendum: Report on the Mission of the
Special Rapporteur to Poland on the Issue of Trafficking and Forced Prostitution of
Women (24 May to 1 June 1996), U.N. ESCOR, Comm'n on Hum. Rts., 53d Sess.,
Agenda Item 9(a), 1 6, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1997/47/Add.1 (1996), cited in COMMITTEE ON
FEMINISM AND INTERNATIONAL L w, supra note 64, at 5.
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unable to prove their nationality." 7 Therefore, even if these women were to
gain freedom, they face the often impossible difficulties associated with
attempting to return to their homeland without proof of nationality.98
Unfortunately, criminals and traffickers are not the only ones who can
render persons stateless by denying citizens of the means to prove their
citizenship. Sometimes governments commit what is known as administra-
tive ethnic cleansing, or erasure. For example, in 1992, the Ministry of the
Interior of the Government of Slovenia surreptitiously removed the files of
many non-Slovene Roma from registers of the permanent residents of
Slovenia.99 The files were moved from the "active" Registrar of Permanent
Residents (RPR) to the inactive or "dead" RPR. This maneuver had the effect
of making the "erased persons," also known as "the erased," appear, at least
on paper, as former permanent residents who no longer reside in Slovenia
for reasons such as death or permanent emigration.100 Apparently the
erasure was executed in order to preclude non-Slovene Roma from being
numbered among the original group of nationals of the newly created
Slovenian state. According to the Government of Slovenia, 29,064 persons
were erased;10' the Helsinki Monitor of Slovenia (HMS) argues, however,
that the number was in fact around 80,000.02
IV. OBSTACLES, HARDSHIPS, AND HURDLES
FACED BY STATELESS PERSONS
Statelessness is a very difficult problem for those who face it. The increased
vulnerability that often accompanies statelessness is illustrated by the plight
97. COMMITTEE ON FEMINISM AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 64, at 5.
98. Id.
99. Jasminka Dedi , The Erasure: Administrative Ethnic Cleansing in Slovenia, RoMA RTS. 3/
2003, available at www.errc.org/cikk.php?cikk=1109&archiv=1. The incident has
come to be known as the "Slovenian Erasure." The Slovenian Erasure is not a clean and
clear example of a mechanism of de facto statelessness. Those persons erased from the
Registrar of Permanent Residents were either already stateless, or they were citizens of
other republics of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) who
migrated to Slovenia prior to Slovenia's independence from the SFRY in 1991-92.
According to the Laws of Slovenia, many, if not most, of the erased were eligible for
Slovenian citizenship at the time of the erasure. Therefore, for the erased that were
stateless at the time the of the erasure, the erasure only worked to perpetuate their
statelessness; and for the erased who had established themselves in Slovenia and whose
entire family lived there, the erasure arguably rendered them de facto stateless, or at
least quasi-stateless, by denying them the citizenship that they most nearly had. Id. n.40.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. See INTERNATIONAL HELSINKI FEDERATION FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE OSCE REGION:
THE BALKANS, THE CAucAsuS, EUROPE, CENTRAL ASIA AND NORTH AMERICA REPORT 2001 (EVENTS OF
2000) 271 (2001), cited in Dedii, supra note 99.
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of stateless Jews during World War II. In Hannah Arendt's seminal book
Eichmann in Jerusalem, 103 Arendt notes that at the Wannsee Conference,'04
prior to the Nazi's implementation of the "Final Solution" to the "Jewish
Question," the Nazi government purposefully rendered stateless all Jews in
its territory.105 This action was done for at least two reasons: "[lit made it
impossible for any country to inquire into [the Jew's] fate, and it enabled the
state in which they were resident to confiscate their property." 06 Addition-
ally, Arendt explains that when the Nazis began deporting Jews from other
states, such as Holland and France, the stateless Jews in those countries
were more vulnerable than Jewish Dutch and French citizens. Indeed,
"deportations [almost always] ...started with stateless Jews." 07 In fact,
Arendt asserts that "the Jews had to lose their nationality before they could
be exterminated."108 Certainly, the barbarous acts committed during the
Holocaust seem to support Arendt's assertion that "one could do as one
pleased" with the stateless. 10 9
Stateless persons not only must deal with the challenges associated with
being vulnerable targets for gross human rights violators, but also they must
deal with the fact that, in many states, nationality is a practical prerequisite
for accessing political and judicial processes and for obtaining economic,
social, and cultural rights. One reason why stateless persons are unable to
access these processes and rights is that stateless persons are often not
issued identity documents by their states of habitual residence. Although the
1954 Convention on the Status of Stateless Persons does require states
parties to supply "stateless persons such documents or certifications as
would normally be delivered to aliens by or through ... national
authorities[,]"110 few countries have ratified the 1954 Convention.
Without identity documents, many stateless persons also find it difficult
to obtain political asylum. Consider, for example, the case of "RA," an
asylum seeker who, fearing for his life, fled to Australia in 2001 ."' RA had
no documentation to support his claim for asylum. He could not even
support his claim that he had formerly resided in Algeria, and his appeal for
103. HANNAH ARENDT, EICHMANN IN JERUSALEM (1963).
104. The Wannsee Conference (20 January 1942) was a "meeting of Nazi officials in the
Berlin suburb of Grossen-Wannsee for the purpose of planning the 'final solution'
(Endliisung) of the 'Jewish question' (Judenfrage)." Wannsee Conference, 12 NEW
ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA 489 (15th ed. 1989)
105. ARENDT, supra note 103, at 115.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 167.
108. Id. at 240.
109. Id.
110. 1954 Convention, supra note 3, art. 25, T 2.
111. See Sarah Stephen, Government Risks Refugees' Lives, GREEN LEFT WEEKLY, 24 Mar. 2004,
at 10.
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asylum was rejected. As a result, RA was held in detention until he could
obtain documentation supporting his case-a period of three years.11 2
Being without identity documents also makes it difficult to obtain basic
social services. In fact, lack of identity documents often preempts stateless
persons from acquiring jobs, receiving medical care, marrying and starting
a family, enjoying legal protection, traveling, owning property, gaining an
education, or registering the birth of their children." 3 The undocumented
and stateless Bidun population of Kuwait, for example, often found
themselves "facing serious obstacles when seeking to register births, ...
divorces, and deaths, because they lacked the required identification and
were typically required to go through lengthy security checks before the
Ministry of Interior would issue a letter of no objection."" 4 Many Kuwaiti
Bidun also have been deprived of their right to marry and start a family: s
"Bidun face difficulty registering marriages between Bidun couples or
between a Bidun and a Kuwaiti citizen because the Bidun member(s) of the
couple lacks a civil ID and must obtain a letter from the Ministry of Interior
and complete a lengthy security check."116
The situation faced by the Kuwaiti Bidun,1"7 numbering approximately
120,000,18 bears resemblance to the plight of Rohingya of Myanmar
(Burma). The Rohingya population of Myanmar,1t 9 which has been esti-
112. See id. While it is not certain that RA was stateless, RA's case is illustrative of the kind
of challenges stateless persons without documentation often face.
113. UNHCR, WHAT WOULD LIFE BE LIKE IF You HAD No NATIONALITY?, supra note 5.
114. BENCOMO, supra note 52.
115. The ICCPR states that "Itihe right of men and women of marriageable age to marry and
to found a family shall be recognized." ICCPR, supra note 6, art. 23, !H 2. In its General
Comment 19, the Human Rights Committee stated that:
The right to found a family implies, in principle, the possibility to procreate and live together...
[and] the possibility to live together implies the adoption of appropriate measures, both at the
internal level and as the case may be, in cooperation with other States, to ensure the unity or
reunification of families, particularly when their members are separated for political, economic or
similar reasons.
General Comment on Article 23, General Comment No. 19, U.N. ESCOR, Hum. Rts.
Comm., 9] 5, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.1 at 28 (1994).
116. BENCOMO, supra note 52.
117. In Arabic, the term bidun is a short for the phrase "without nationality" (bidun jinsiya).
In Kuwait, bidun "refers to longtime residents of Kuwait who, under the terms of
Nationality Law 15/1959, should be eligible for Kuwaiti nationality by naturalization
but who have not been granted citizenship." Id.
118. Id.
119. According to Rohingya leaders, the "Rohingya are an ethnically distinct group,
descendants of the first Muslims who began migrating to northern Arakan state in the
eighth century, though they also say that they are a mix of Bengalis, Persians, Moghuls,
Turks, and Pathans who came to [northern Arakan, Myanmarl." ZAMA COURSEN-NEFF,
LIVING IN LIMBO: BURMESE ROHINGYAS IN MALAYSIA (2000), available at www.hrw.org/reports/
2000/malaysia/.
Vol. 28
Human Rights of Stateless Persons
mated to range from 5,100 to 8,000 people,1 20 also has experienced such
problems. As one Rohingya welder explained, employers are "afraid to
[hire] undocumented people" 121 so Rohingya "must rely on what they call
'daily work'-poorly-paid, short-term manual labor." 122 In addition to this,
the undocumented and stateless Rohingya "are increasingly being denied
access to health care ... schools are turning away their children," and
Rohingya have faced tremendous difficulties obtaining housing.1 23
The Rohingya have not only faced difficulty obtaining social services
and protections, they also have faced infringements on their civil and
political rights, such as their right not to be subjected to arbitrary detention:124
Rohingya refugees and asylum-seekers in Malaysia are often detained for
months in immigration camps where they suffer malnutrition, unsanitary
conditions, and beatings before being pushed over the border into Thailand.
The Malaysian government increasingly restricts their access to education and
health services, and, to date, the office of the United Nations High Commis-
sioner for Refugees (UNHCR), which has an office in Malaysia, has been unable
to secure effective legal protection for the Rohingya. 12 S
Unfortunately, the problem of prolonged and unwarranted imprison-
ment is not limited to stateless Rohingya. Unnecessary imprisonment is one
of the most pervasive and most difficult problems faced by stateless persons.
According to the UNHCR, when stateless persons are unable to return to
their countries of habitual residence after having left them, often in search of
asylum or refugee status, the result is often prolonged detention outside of
the country in which they habitually reside.126 The reason for such detention
is that, without proof of identity or nationality, stateless persons often cannot
reenter their state of habitual residence. Furthermore, the detaining state
cannot resolve the question of where to deport the stateless detainee, and it
is unwilling to let them illegally reside within its territory. 27 In such cases,
120. Id.
121. Human Rights Watch Interview, in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia (20 & 30 Nov. 1999; 2 Dec.
1999), cited in COURSEN-NEFF, supra note 119, ch. 3.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Universal Declaration, supra note 1, art. 9.
125. COURSEN-NEFF, supra note 119, ch. 1.
126. In such cases, the UNHCR recommends that "It]he detaining authorities should make
every effort to resolve such cases in a timely manner, including, through practical steps
to identify and confirm the individuals nationality status in order to determine which
State they may be returned to, or through negotiations with the country of habitual
residence arrange for their re-admission." UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FO  REFUGEES
(UN HCR), UNHCR's GUIDELINES ON APPLICABLE CRITERIA AND STANDARDS RELATING TO THE DETENTION
OF ASYLUM-SEEKERS (1999).
127. Id. (H 6.
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stateless persons have been held in prolonged or "indefinite detention" only
because the question of where to send them remains unresolved. 128
The problem of prolonged and unwarranted imprisonment is often
exacerbated when states, having failed to resolve the question of where to
send a particular stateless person, nonetheless attempt to rid themselves of
the stateless person by deporting him or her to another state that is also
unwilling to receive the person. In such cases, a stateless person may spend
years in detention, being passed from state to state like an unwanted pariah.
Consider the case of Eidreiss al Salih: 129
Twenty-nine year-old Eidreiss al Salih arrived in Australia in 2000 to seek
asylum. He was born in Kuwait to Sudanese immigrant parents, but Kuwait
refused to accept his family as citizens. He spent three years in detention before
the Australian government tried unsuccessfully to deport him to Sudan on
December 13.
[The Australian Government] made no attempt to independently verify his
nationality before they tried to deport him to Sudan, issuing him with a
document stating his nationality as Sudanese.
Australian officials claimed that the Sudanese embassy in Tanzania was
waiting for Salih. However, his [Australian-issued] identity papers were rejected
by embassy officials on December 14.
[A] South African security firm contracted by [the Australian Government]
to "accompany" deportees, falsely informed Tanzanian officials that Salih was
deported from Australia for committing a criminal act. As a result, he was
transferred from immigration detention at the Dar es Salaam airport to a police
station cell, according to a lawyer who was present, where he was kept for a
further five days.
He was then transferred back to South Africa, where he spent six nights at
Johannesburg airport, in a room with no windows or bed, and denied visitors.
He was flown back to Perth[, Australia,] on December 24[, 2003]. 110
As of May 2004, Mr. al Salih was still in an Australian detention center. He
has reapplied for asylum."'
128. Id. at Guideline 9.
129. Stephen, supra note 111, at 10. Consider also the case of an eighteen-year-old stateless
Hutu man named "C," whose failed attempt to seek asylum in Australia led to three
years of detention:
[Alfter nearly three years of detention, the Australian authorities sent [CI to Kenya. [C] is an 18-
year-old Hutu, orphaned during the conflict in Kenya eight years earlier. He was escorted under
guard to Johannesburg and on to a Kenya Airlines plane to Nairobi. He had emergency travel
documents from the Australian authorities but these were taken from him at the airport in Nairobi.
... Once again IC became stateless and without documents with the predictable consequence of
further imprisonment.
Id.
130. Id.
131. Stephanie Kennedy, Sudanese Asylum Seeker Sent around the World (ABC News-
Australia radio broadcast 26 May 2004), available at www.abc.net.au/pm/contentV
2004/sl 116633.htm.
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In addition to prolonged and unwarranted imprisonment, stateless
persons are frequently subjected to other forms of civil and political
discrimination. For example, the 2001 statistics gathered by Estonia's
Ministry of Justice suggest that the Estonian criminal justice system is
infringing upon stateless persons' human rights to equal protection before
the law.13 2 The report indicated that over a quarter of criminal convictions in
Estonia were imposed upon stateless persons. 133 This percentage is quite
remarkable when one considers that stateless persons comprise 13 percent
of Estonia's population.1 34
Another civil and political right often denied to stateless persons is the
right to leave and enter one's own country. This right is granted by both the
Universal Declaration1 35 and the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.' 1 6
The Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, for example, specifies in Article
12 that "[elveryone shall be free to leave any country, including his own" 137
and that "[n]o one shall be arbitrarily deprived of the right to enter his own
country."'3 8 Despite having ratified the Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, countries such as Kuwait continue to deny stateless persons the right
to leave and return to their own countries. According to Human Rights
Watch, "Kuwait refuses to acknowledge the right of return of, and arbitrarily
denies re-entry to,. many Bidun who can claim Kuwait as their 'own
country[,]' . . . particularly with regard to Bidun who became stranded
abroad after the 1991 liberation of Kuwait from Iraqi occupation."'3 9 In
addition to denying Bidun the right to leave and return to Kuwait, the
Kuwaiti Government has also "carried out deportations of Bidun, and then
denied them re-entry to what effectively constitutes their 'own country.' 1 40
Such problems with freedom of movement faced by stateless Kuwaiti
132. Estonian Statistics Show Quarter of Convictions Go to Stateless Persons, TALLINN BNS, 11
Aug. 2001 (on file with author). The human right to equal protection before the law is
protected by the Universal Declaration, supra note 1, art. 7; ICCPR, supra note 6, art. 26
(which Estonia has ratified without reservations).
133. Estonian Statistics Show Quarter of Convictions Go to Stateless Persons, supra note 132.
134. Commission of the European Communities, 2001 Regular Report on Estonia's Progress
Towards Accession, at 21, SEC (2001) 1747 (13 Nov. 2001), available atwww.eib.ee/
files/pr2001 ee.pdf.
135. Universal Declaration, supra note 1, art. 13.
136. ICCPR, supra note 6, art. 12.
137. Id. art. 12, 2.
138. Id. art. 12, 11 4. It should be noted that, according to the United Nations Human Rights
Committee, this language "does not distinguish between nationals and aliens" and
therefore "permits a broader interpretation that might embrace other categories of long-
term residents, including but not limited to stateless persons arbitrarily deprived of the
right to acquire the nationality of the country of such residence." General Comment on
Article 12, General Comment No. 27, U.N. ESCOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., 20, U.N.
Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.9 (1999).
139. BENCOMO, supra note 52.
140. Id.
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Biduns are not isolated to this population. 4 ' To the contrary, these problems
are characteristic of the plights of stateless persons everywhere.
To be sure, the problems and situations faced by stateless Rohingya and
Bidun are typical of the difficulties faced by many other stateless popula-
tions, including the Roma of Eastern Europe, the Karens of Thailand,
stateless Vietnamese asylum-seekers in Hong Kong, and ethnic Chinese in
Taiwan. Like these ethnic minorities, stateless women are often particularly
vulnerable to the vagaries of stateless life. For example, when "facilitation of
the acquisition of nationality ... depends on marriage to a national[, ...
the national spouse [is given inordinate] control over the non-national
spouse."42 In the United States, prior to the 1994 Violence Against Women
Act (VAWA), only a permanent US resident or citizen spouse could petition
for a stateless or foreign spouse to become a resident; 43 and the petitioner
controlled if and when the residency application was filed. 114 All too
frequently, this control over if and when the residency application was filed
allowed physically abusive spouses, predominantly men, inordinate control
over their nonresident spouses. For example:
A woman from the Philippines was abused by her U.S. citizen spouse. He
threatened to have immigration authorities deport her to the Philippines if she
tried to leave him. She stayed. He later cut her all over her back, head, and
hands with a meat cleaver ....
A Dominican woman fled from her U.S. citizen husband's violent assaults
only after being hospitalized for the fifth time as a result of his beatings. Her
husband bashed her head against the wall and threatened to kill her if she told
her doctor what happened. She had been afraid to leave him because he
controlled her immigration status. 145
The nature of the pre-1 994 US immigration process thus created the risk that
the stateless or foreign spouse, more frequently the wife, might suffer
domestic abuse in order to acquire residency status. 146
141. As another example, consider the situation faced by stateless Karens of Thailand. These
stateless persons "are not allowed to travel outside to work .... Those who do out of
necessity are regularly harassed physically and financially." Sanitsuda Ekachai, Thai
Govt Urged to Find a Comprehensive Solution to Burmese Migration Problem, BANCKOK
POST, 26 Apr. 2002. Further, examples earlier in this chapter involving trafficked persons
and female victims of dependent nationality laws are also illustrative of cases in which
statelessness leads to obstruction of the right to return to one's own country.
142. COMMITTEE ON FEMINISM AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 64, at 22.
143. See American Immigration Law Center, How Do I Apply for Immigration Benefits as a
Battered Spouse or Child? (2003), available at www.ailc.com/howdoi/battered.htm.
144. COMMITTEE ON FEMINISM AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 64, at 22.
145. J.M. Calvo, Spouse-Based Immigration Laws: The Legacy of Coverture, in CRTIcAL RACE
FEMINISM: A READER 380, 380 (1997).
146. See generally id. at 380-86 (offering examples of the difficulties encountered by
stateless women).
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V. ADDRESSING THE PROBLEM OF STATELESSNESS
The problem of statelessness can be addressed in a variety of ways.
Generally, however, the remedies for statelessness can be classified in the
following categories: (a) preemptive remedies; (b) minimization remedies;
and (c) naturalizing remedies. Preemptive remedies, when properly imple-
mented, stop statelessness before it develops. A recent Human Rights Watch
report,147 which focused in part on statelessness in Malaysia, suggested a
preemptive remedy to the Malaysian statelessness problem. It recom-
mended that Malaysia's "Department of Registration should make efforts to
ensure that all children who are born in Malaysia, regardless of their
nationality, are registered upon birth and provided with birth registration
documents" and that "Malaysia should interpret its laws as applicable to
Rohingya children" and grant them citizenship "under . . . Part II of
Malaysia's Federal Constitution ."148
Sections of the 1961 Convention and the Convention on the Rights of
the Child are also illustrative of preemptive remedies. The 1961 Conven-
tion, for instance, essentially proscribes states parties from performing
actions that would render stateless those persons living within the territories'
of states parties. In the same spirit, the Convention on the Rights of the Child
compels a state party to grant citizenship at birth to all children born within
its territory, "in particular where the child would otherwise be stateless." 4 9
The remedies for statelessness suggested by the previously cited Human
Rights Watch report, as well as the 1961 Convention and the Convention on
the Rights of the Child, are preemptive, because when properly imple-
mented, the remedies preclude statelessness in advance of its development.
While preemptive remedies prevent individuals from becoming state-
less, thereby benefitting, for example, newly born children or women who
might be rendered stateless by marriage, minimization remedies lessen the
difficulties associated with statelessness and serve to protect stateless
persons from discrimination. Minimization remedies, however, do not result
in the elimination or prevention of statelessness and, therefore, can never be
a replacement for citizenship. As the information and accession package for
the 1954 and 1961 Conventions eloquently states: "[w]hile the extension of
certain rights generally associated with nationality, such as voting, employ-
ment, or ownership of property, may be one means of normalising the status
of noncitizens on a State's territory, there is no replacement for nationality
itself." 1s0 Overall, the 1954 Convention prescribes a series of minimization
147. COURSEN-NE-F, supra note 119.
148. Id.
149. Children's Convention, supra note 7, art. 7, $ 2.
150. UNHCR, INFORMATION AND ACCESSION PACKAGE, supra note 47.
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remedies. For example, Article 27 of the 1954 Convention obligates states
parties to "issue identity papers to any stateless person in their territory who
does not possess a valid travel document.""' Such provisions may alleviate
some of the difficulties associated with statelessness but do not fundamen-
tally alter one's status as a stateless person.
Naturalizing remedies for statelessness focus on securing citizenship for
those already stateless. The Sri Lankan parliament, for example, imple-
mented a naturalizing remedy for statelessness in 2003 when it passed a law
granting citizenship to over 168,000 stateless Tamils. l s2 The Indonesian
government also executed a naturalizing remedy when it extended citizen-
ship to some 140,000 ethnic Chinese."5 3 Interestingly, none of the UN
treaties mentioned in this chapter, including the 1954 and 1961 Stateless-
ness Conventions and the Convention on the Rights of the Child, obligate
states parties to implement naturalizing remedies for statelessness. The 1954
Convention, in Article 32, does require states parties to "as far as possible
[to] facilitate the assimilation and naturalization of stateless persons."51 4 This
provision, however, is weak and subject to flexible interpretation.
As long as statelessness exists, all three of the remedies mentioned
above are important and essential. Preventative remedies are necessary for
the total eradication of statelessness. Minimization remedies, while they
should never be seen as a replacement for preemptive and naturalizing
remedies, should be in place to alleviate the difficulties of statelessness
while persons are naturalized or seek naturalizing. Finally, naturalizing
remedies offer the only complete remedy for stateless persons.
A. International Law and the Implementation of
Remedies for Statelessness
States might implement remedies for statelessness because they are obli-
gated to do so as parties to international treaties. Unfortunately, however,
the treaties that were created to bear directly upon the problem of
statelessness, the 1954 and 1961 Conventions,' have few states parties, as
illustrated by Table 1. In addition, the effectiveness of the 1954 and 1961
Conventions are not only constrained by limited ratification, they also are
151. 1954 Convention, supra note 3.
152. Sri Lanka Grants Citizenship to More than 168,000 Stateless Tamils, BBC WORLDWIDE
MONITORING, 7 Oct. 2003.
153. "Stateless" Ethnic Chinese To Receive Indonesian Citizenship, BEIJING XINHUA, 27 July
2000.
154. 1954 Convention, supra note 3.
155. See id.; see also 1961 Convention, supra note 10.
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TABLE 1
Ratification Information For, in the Given Order,
the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness (1961 Convention),
the 1954 Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons (1954 Convention),
the Convention on the Nationality of Married Women (CNMW),
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),
the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), and the
Convention on the Rights of the Child (Children's Convention), Respectively
State Remaining Day of
Parties Signatories Last Update
1961 Convention 30 3 10/19/05
1954 Convention 58 6 10/19/05
CNMW 73 10 10/19/05
ICCPR 154 7 10/19/05
CEDAW 180 1 10/19/05
Children's Convention 192 2 10/19/05
limited by lack of monitoring. Indeed, none of the six bodies set up by the
UN to monitor human rights treaties are responsible for monitoring the
1954 Convention or the 1961 Convention.15 6
Given that the 1954 and 1961 Conventions have been ratified by few
states and are not monitored by associated UN treaty monitoring bodies, it
is difficult to enforce the human rights standards delineated in these two
treaties. Nonetheless, provisions designed to prevent statelessness and to
protect stateless persons are contained within widely ratified"5 7 and moni-
tored'1 8 human rights treaties, such as the Convention on the Rights of the
Child, the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the Convention on the
Elimination of All forms of Discrimination against Women. Unfortunately,
however, the Committee on the Rights of the Child and the Human Rights
Committee have reprimanded only a few states for failing to comply with
156. Treaty bodies have been established to monitor the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights; the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; the
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination; the
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women; the
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment; and the Convention on the Rights of the Child.
157. As indicated by Table 1 (Annex), the Convention on the Rights of the Child and the
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women have
been ratified by 192, 177, and 152 countries, respectively.
158. Implementation of the Convention on the Rights of the Child is monitored by the
Committee on the Rights of the Child; the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms
of Discrimination against Women is monitored by the Committee on the Elimination of
Discrimination against Women; and the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights is
monitored by the Human Rights Committee.
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provisions related to statelessness embedded in the Convention on the
Rights of the Child and the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. The
Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women seems to
have never reprimanded a state party for failing to comply with the
provisions regarding statelessness embedded in the Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women. Furthermore,
the treaty bodies mandated to monitor the Convention on the Rights of the
Child and the Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, the two
most broadly ratified human rights treaties,5 9 rarely monitor or give focus to
the provisions related to statelessness embedded within the two treaties.
The Committee on the Rights of the Child and the Human Rights
Committee, however, have advised states parties to reduce or to prevent
statelessness on a handful of occasions. During its review of Cambodia's
initial report, 160 for example, the Committee on the Rights of the Child
expressed concern that Cambodia's "Law on Nationality (1996) might lead
to discrimination against children of non-Khmer origin and might, in
violation of Article 7 of the Convention [on the Rights of the Child], leave as
stateless a large number of children born in Cambodia, such as children
belonging to minority groups." 61 In light of this concern, the Committee on
the Rights of the Child recommended that Cambodia's "Law on Nationality
be reviewed in the light of the Convention with a view to eliminating all
grounds of possible discrimination and eradicating and preventing children
being stateless."16 2 The Human Rights Committee has similarly advocated
on behalf of stateless, or potentially stateless, children. For example, during
its review of Columbia's fourth periodic report, the Human Rights Commit-
tee stressed "the duty of the State party to ensure that every child born in
Colombia enjoys the right, under Article 24, paragraph 3, of the Covenant
[on Civil and Political Rights], to acquire a nationality. It therefore
recommends that the State party consider conferring Colombian nationality
on stateless children born in Colombia." 63
The treaty monitoring bodies' responses to violations of the right to
nationality, quoted above, are admirable steps in the right direction. Such
responses, however, are all too infrequent. Indeed, the plight of stateless
159. As indicated by Table 1 (Annex), the Children's Convention has been ratified by 192
countries and the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights has been ratified by 152
countries.
160. See Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Rights of the Child: Cambodia,
U.N. ESCOR, Comm. on Rts. of the Child, 24th Sess., T 31, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/15/
Add.128 (2000).
161. Id. T 31.
162. Id. 32.
163. Concluding Observations by the Human Rights Committee, U.N. ESCOR, Hum. Rts.
Comm., 9 43, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.76 (1997).
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persons stands to improve greatly when the provisions related to stateless-
ness embedded within broadly ratified and monitored human rights treaties,
such as the Convention on the Rights of the Child and the Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights, are given greater focus and attention by treaty
monitoring bodies and governments. Nongovernmental organizations (NGO)
also have a role to play. When treaty bodies are preparing to review a state
party's compliance with a given treaty, they generally welcome information
provided by NGOs in the form of oral and written reports.164 Information on
state party's compliance provided by NGOs often provides the only
alternative account of a state party's compliance with treaty obligations.
Furthermore, information provided by NGOs often results in the acceptance
of recommendations that states parties are required to implement. 161
B. The Role of Regional Cooperation and
Interests in the Reduction of Statelessness
The presence of large numbers of stateless persons in a given region can
often produce regional instability. To be sure, displacement and flows of
refugees, which frequently result from statelessness, often threaten the
peace and stability of a region. 166 Because the instability created by
statelessness makes reducing statelessness in the best interest of regions or
regional organizations such as the European Union or the Organization of
American States, regional relations are often improved when states work to
eliminate statelessness and to resolve nationality disputes.167 Often, regional
pressures can impel an otherwise reluctant state government to naturalize
stateless citizens or otherwise to address statelessness in its territory.
Regional pressures have certainly influenced Estonia's and Latvia's
treatment of stateless persons. Latvia's recent entrance into the European
Union was threatened by the country's large stateless population,' 68 and the
country responded. Since 1995, Latvia has naturalized nearly 70,000
persons, most of whom were stateless. 6 9 Furthermore, in 1999, Latvia
began granting citizenship to children of stateless persons and noncitizens
born within the country's territory.
Estonia's large stateless population also jeopardized the country's recent
164. See Amnesty International, The Role of Civil Society: Role of NGOs, available at
web.amnesty.org/web/web.nsf/pri nt/treaty-ngo-eng.
165. Id.
166. UNHCR, WHAT WOULD LIFE BE LIKE IF You HAD No NATIONALITY?, supra note 5.
167. Id.
168. See Nearly 70,000 People Naturalised in Latvia, EU BUSINESS, 13 Jan. 2004, available at
www.eubusiness.com/Latvia/0401131 70059.xd7m1 65n.
169. Id.
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entry into the European Union. As Evelyn Sepp, a lawmaker with Estonia's
Centre Party, noted, "[F]rom the point of view of a state or a union of states,
a large number of stateless persons, who have been deprived of essential
political rights, represents a threat to democracy and internal stability."170
Estonia has thus taken steps naturalize stateless citizens.171
VI. CONCLUSION
One way to ensure that stateless persons realize their right to a nationality,1 72
as enunciated in Article 15 of the Universal Declaration, is through the
doctrine of the genuine and effective link.173 According to this doctrine, a
person should be eligible to receive citizenship from states with which she
or he has a substantial connection or a genuine and effective link. At the
very least, a person should be eligible for the citizenship of the country with
which she or he has the closest link or connection. A substantial link or
connection to a state can be forged by, for example, long-term habitation in
a state without a more substantial link to another state, descent from a state's
citizen, birth within a state's territory, or citizenship in a country's former
federal state. 74
The doctrine of the genuine and effective link is a viable solution to the
problem of statelessness because it is generally "not difficult to determine to
which state an individual has a genuine effective link for purposes of
nationality decisions. . . . [D]ifficulties in preventing or reducing stateless-
ness often occur as a result of legislative, judicial, administrative, and
political decisions which fail to recognize basic principles of international
law with respect to nationality."175 Indeed, there is hardly a person without
a genuine and substantial link to a state. As a practical matter, however, a
sovereign state has the right to determine who receives its citizenship. This
right, however, should be congruent with relevant international standards
and laws. At a minimum, these standards prohibit states from rendering their
citizens stateless, oblige states to respect the human rights of stateless
persons, and obligate states to grant citizenship to all children born within
state borders.
170. Bill Tabled in Estonian Parliament to Coax Stateless Persons into Citizenship, TALLINN
BNS IN ENGLISH, 20 Dec. 2001 (on file with author).
171. See id.
172. Universal Declaration, supra note 1.
173. See generally Jeffrey L. Blackman, State Successions and Statelessness: The Emerging
Right to an Effective Nationality Under International Law, 19 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1141
(1998).
174. Geske, supra note 12.
175. Id.
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